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	. Do financial restatements dampen firm performance? One 
argument about this is that restatements hurt investor confidence in the 
credibility of a firm’s disclosure, resulting in a decline in demand for the 
firm’s securities, thereby, leading to a significant drop in asset price. On the 
other hand, agency theory suggests that family ownership could have 
potential benefits to a firm’s performance. An increase in family ownership 
will have a greater concern for reputation to the controlling family in 
producing high quality accounting information and, thereby, reduce the 
likelihood of financial restatements. We evaluate these arguments by 
distinguishing the effects of restatements on firm performance under two 
corporate governance environments; family-controlled and CEO duality 
companies. Based on a sample of Malaysian listed companies in 2008 after 
the post MCCG 2007 initiative, our findings suggest that (1) restatements 
dampen firm performance, (2) the dampening impacts of restatements are 
completely mitigated in family-controlled companies, and (3) the 
dampening effects are more pronounced in non-family controlled companies 
than family-controlled companies in non-CEO duality companies. Using 
this evidence, we recommend that Malaysian regulators develop policies 
that are unique to the Malaysian markets so as to curtail accounting 
irregularities. They should reconsider the relevance of requiring CEO non-
duality as a practice of good corporate governance and encourage more 
investment in family-controlled companies. 
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